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SUPPLY RESPONSE AND MONEY DEMAND IN A PEASANT ECONOMY WITH RATIONING AND RISK. 
Introduction 
We consider a developing country which is heavily dependent upon agri-
cultural exports and which is characterized by two institutional rigidities. 
First, while export crops are privately produced, the government is the 
sole agent who can buy crops from farmers and export them. The producer . 
price which farmers receive is fixed in real terms. Secondly, the government 
controls the allocation of imports between farmers and the rest of the 
economy, the urban sector. The government's own demand (direct and 
indirect ) for imports and that of urban firms and consumers must be 
satisfied to a minimum extent: the allocation of imports to the urban sector 
can exceed this minimum level (the 'urban claim') but a lower allocation is 
politically not feasible. Elsewhere we have applied the model to Tanzania 
(Bevan et al. , f orthcoming-) , but the description characterizes many 
developing countries. 
Using a barter model, we show that in such an economy the market clearing 
equilibrium is not globally stable. Once goods markets get rationed, the 
economy gets caught in a downward spiral; the micro-economie reaction of 
farmers to rationing is magnified by its macro^economic repercussions, via 
the balance of payments. Further, in non-market clearing conditions, 
agents' response to price changes are shown to be the opposite of that 
likely under market clearing. Hence, appropriate changes in pricing policy 
in an economy subject to rationing cannot be inferred from knowledge about 
behaviour under market clearing conditions. 
In the fix-price equilibrium literature, it is normally assumed, e.g. 
Malinvaud (1977) , that agents know with certainty how much they wlll be 
able to buy of the rationed goods. This may apply when, as in Europe during 
wartime rationing, a coupon system is used. If an economy arrivés in a 
rationing regime by accident, there is however no formal.rationing system. 
In that case availability of consumption goods to.farmers is likely to 
become highly uncertain, both over time and over individuals, as indeed 
it is in Tanzania. This source of risk has important implications for asset 
demand. 
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This point has, to the best of our knowledge, been ignored in the literature. 
In Malinvaud's well-known model consumers hold an asset ('money') but risk 
and its consequences for intertemporal behaviour are ignored: the consumer's 
money balance is an argument of the utility function for the current period. 
Benassy (1975, pp. 515-18) has shown how that specification can be derived 
from a two-period formulation in which availability in the second period 
is risky. He considers the implications of this formulation for the existence 
of equilibrium, but not for changes in (mean) availability on optimal money 
stocks, stating only in passing (p. 516) that rationing leads to a 'flight 
from money'. We show in section 4 (where the barter model is extended by 
the introduction of money and stochastic rationing) that this is, in general, 
not true: under stochastic rationing a decrease in availability may lead 
to an increase in money demand. 
Stochastic rationing in such an economy implies the possibility of 
a 'honeymoon' for the government, a period during which exports are 
temporarily higher than the amount consistent with reduced availability 
of consumption goods in- rural areas: farmers work harder in the short run 
in order to adjust their money stocks. We show that there are three types 
of equilibria in this model and derive necessary and sufficiënt conditions 
for each. These conditions involve the degree of risk aversion and the 
probability distribution of the amount which can be bought, i.e. both the 
mean and the riskiness of the ration. 
The monetary consequences of stochastic rationing have important policy 
implications. A liberalization programme in which the government restored 
farmers' access to consumption goods to the level :of the unrationed 
equilibrium (through an aid-financed increase in imports) might fail as 
farmers consumed more without raising their production in order to run 
down their excess money balancès. In this situation the government must 
either give up its policy, as reflected in the two institutional rigidities, 
or default on part of the monetary claims held by farmers. 
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2. Rationing of farmers in a barter economy 
Consider a farmer who can produce two crops: a cash erop and a food erop. 
Production is denoted by q and q respectively. The cash erop is not 
consumed by the farmer and can be sold at a price p. The food erop is 
consumed and can be bought and sold at prices p , p respectively (p > p ) 
In addition to the two crops there are two other goods in the model: 
leisure (£) and a consumption good (e) which can be acquired only 
through trade. Production requires only labour and q. (i=f,c) denotes 
1
 1 (by choice of units) both production and labour input. Writmg t 
for the total time available for farm work, leisure is defined by: 
(1) q f + q c = t - £. 
The budget constraint may be written as 
(2) c <_ pq c + Tr(qf-f) 
where f denotes consumption of the food erop and 
(3) TT = 
P s if qf > f 
P b if q f < f 
The farmer's utility funotion u(c,f,£) satisfies u.. < 0 < u.. 
il ï 
We assume that the market for the food erop is véry imperfect: there is 
a wide range between the buying and selling price. In particular, we 
assume that the producer price of the cash erop lies in this range: 
(4) p b > p > p s. 
If the farmer were to maximize his utility function subject to (1), (2) 
and (3) he would choose the vector (c*, f*, i*). This (unrationéd) 
equilibrium he can, however, not attain: demand for the consumption good 
is rationed: 
(5) c <_ x 
where the ration x is known with certainty to the farmer and is strictly 
less than e*. 
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Note that if the food erop could be bought and sold at the same 
price then the farmer would be fully specialized: he would produce only 
the cash erop or only the food erop, depending upon whether p was greater 
or less than p = p . Assumption (4), however, implies that he will 
produce both crops and, in particular, that he will be selfsufficiënt 
in food. This follows from (2). The budget constraint must be binding 
(both in rationed and in unrationed equilibrium), because otherwise 
(keeping c and f constant) leisure (•£) could be increased and (since u, 
is positive) this would increase utility. But if the budget constraint 
is binding then q must be equal to f. For suppose on the contrary, that 
q exceeds f. Then a combination of an increase in cash erop production 
and a decrease in food erop production such that the budget constraint 
remains unaffected (pAq + p Aq = 0) would increase leisure and hence 
utility: A£ = -(Aq +Aq ) = Aq (-1+p/p ) > 0. Similarly, at an optimum 
f cannot exceed q_. Because if it did then an increase in q^ (and an 
f f 
offsetting decrease in q ) would increase leisure: A£ = Aq (-1+p/p) > 0. 
Hence f = q_ and the problem reduces to: 
max u(c,t-£-q,l) 
c,ü,,q 
subject to 
(6) e <_ pq 
(7) C < X 
where we have dropped the subscript of q : q denotes cash erop production. 
We are interested in the effect on q of changes in the two variables 
controlled by the government: the producer price óf the cash erop and the 
consumption good ration (p,x). 
Consider first a change in price. If the rationing constraint is effective, 
2 
then,.since (6) must also hold as an equality : 
(8) q = x/p. 
Hence the supply response is perverse: cash erop production is decreasing in the 
producer price. While this conclusion is almost trivial as a theoretical 
result, it deserves to be emphasized, since those who advocate 'getting 
prices right' in policy discussions seem to'have given little thought to 
what that phrase might mean in the context of an economy in which farmers 
For example, 
are rationed. in Tanzania the IMF has advocated large increases in producer 
prices for cash crops in order to raise exports. Opponents of the IMF 
have countered that price increases are unlikely to do much gopd if 
farmers cannot spend the extra money; that the policy is likely to be 
actually harmful if farmers value leisure positively seems to have gone 
unnoticed. 
The effect of an increase in the ration (keeping the producer price fixed) 
is, of course, positive: from (8), output of the cash erop increases 
proportionately With the ration. 
In unrationed equilibrium, c* and q* are functions of p only. If these 
functions are monotonie, we can write: 
(9) -1 -1 
c (c*) = p = q (q*) 
This defines the farmers' offer curve: the locus of values of q (cash erop 
'exports' from rural areas to the rest of the economy) and c ('imports' 
of consumption goods into rural areas) such that utility is maximized, 
subject to (6). Under this trade-theoretic interpretation we consider 
farmers and the rest of the economy as two separate countries. Note that 
for points on the offer curve the 'balance of payments' is in equilibrium 
(since c* = pq*). 
In Figure 1 we show this offer curve as an increasing, concave function 
q*(c*). Under rationing the offer curve becomes a straight line q = c/p 
(where c equals x) . If, e.g., the producer price p would be equal to the 
slope AB/OA then in unrationed equilibrium farmers would choose point B. 
cash erop f 
production farmers' offer curve 
foreign offer curve 
M H Q imports 
Figure 1. Macro-economie Effects of Rural Rationing. 
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In rationed equilibrium they would choose a point on the line OB; e.g. 
for x equal to OH, they would choose point I. 
Macro-economie effects of rationing 
So far the analysis has been partial since x is treated as exogenous: 
while changes in availability of consumption goods to farmers affect output 
of the cash erop, no account has been taken of feedback. To analyse the 
macro-economie effects of rationing we introducé an urban sector. This is 
4 
rudimentary, consisting only of the government and of urban consumers. 
The government imports consumption goods and decides on the allocation of 
these imports between rural and urban consumers. There are no other imports 
and the cash erop (which the government procures from farmers) is the only 
export product. 
The world price of the cash erop is given, hence the foreign offer curve is 
shown in Figure 1 as a straight line. The government is constrained in 
two ways: first, it is politically committed to price control and, secondly, 
it must satisfy urban consumption demand (a fixed quantity, equal to CD 
in the diagram). This urban claim is represented as a shift to the left 
(OG) of the foreign offer curve. If farmers choose point B, exports would 
be OA, and AD could be imported, more than sufficiënt to satisfy both farmers 
and urban consumers. Note that only points in the shaded area, enclosed 
by the farmers' offer curve and the displaced foreign offer curve are 
feasible in this sense. 
As drawn, the farmers' offer curve is at B parallel to the foreign offer 
curve. This is relevant if the government's objective is to maximize urban 
consumption. It would then set the domestic price: of the cash erop at AB/OA. 
Point B would then be an optimum and the difference between the world price 
and the lower domestic price would be the revenue-maximizing tax. However, it 
is not essential to our argument that the domestic price is set at this 
revenue-maximizing level, but rather that the initial point B lies on the 
farmers' offer curve, between E and F. 
At B no agents are rationed. However, now consider a disturbance to this 
equilibrium. Suppose that, as a result of a random shock such as a bad 
harvest, output falls from OA to OJ. Farmers then expect to get a quantity 
JI of consumption goods but receive only JK since imports fall to JL and 
KL is allocated to urban consumers. A point such as K cannot be a stationary 
equilibrium, since if farmers expected to receive only JK they would not 
be willing to produce as much as MK but only MN. If farmers expect rationing 
to continue and are sufficiently pessimistic about 'the ration x then the 
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economy gets caught in a downward spiral: cash erop production decreases, 
exports fall, less can be imported, farmers are more severely rationed, 
they revise their expectations of x downwards and produce even less. This 
process of cumulative contraction does not converge: it stops when produc-
tion falls below OP and the urban claim can no longer be honoured. 
How can such a decline be arrested? Once the economy has arrived at a 
point such as K, changing the producer price is not advisable for two 
reasons. First, we have already noted that the supply response under rationing 
is perverse. This price would have to be lowered, but the government has no 
way of knowing by how much to reduce p in order to reach the point on the 
farmers' offer curve directly above K. There is a danger of overshooting: 
p might be lowered too much in which case cash erop production would be 
further reduced. Secondly, if (as is likely) the producer price was sub-
optimal to begin with, then farmers would be given conflicting signals: 
the price would first be reduced (to break out of the rationing regime), 
but would later, once availability started to improve, have to be raised 
in order to move along the farmers' offer curve to a point beyond B. The 
only alternative to a price policy is an increase in the ration x. As long 
as the urban claim must be satisfied this is feasible only if aid can be 
obtained to finance a temporary excess of imports over exports. In the 
model of this section such an aid-financed recovery would succeed provided 
the amount of aid was at least MQ. 
4. Stochastic rationing in a two-period model with money 
We have, so far, discussed a barter economy. Introducing money into that 
model would not add anything of interest since transaction demand would 
be the only reason for holding money. However, if we drop the assumption 
that the farmer knows the amount of the ration with certainty, then 
there is an additional reason for holding money. In this section we 
consider the implications of stochastic rationing for the demand for 
money and the extent to which the holding of money balances affects our 
previous analysis. 
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We simplify the model by dropping the food erop: the utility function 
now has two ' arguments, consumption of the urban good (c) and the number 
of hours worked on the cash erop (h). We assume that production requires 
only labour and that the prices of the cash erop and of the consumption 
good are fixed at unity in terms of money. Hence, h measures not only 
effort but also production, the value of sales and the volume of consump-
tion which, in the absence of rationing, can be financed with the proceeds. 
We assume that the utility function u(c,h) satisfies: 
(10a) u1 > 0 > u2; u 2 = u <_ 0 
(10b) the Hessian of u is negative definite 
(10c) u (0,0) + u {0,0) > 0 
(lOd) u (c,h) is convex in c. 
Note that u is assumed to be negative, since h is negatively related to 
leisure. Assumption (10c) ensures that in the absence of risk consumption 
is positive. Assumption (lOd) gives a sufficiënt (but not necessary) 
condition for at least one of the constraints (12), (13) to be binding 
6 
at an optxmum. 
A period starts just before harvest time. The amount of work involved 
in harvesting is largely determined by past decisions (e.g. weeding, 
spraying). We ignore the labour tasks other than harvesting, but we do 
assume that the amount of work in the current period (h ) is predetermined. 
We measure money balances (m ) just after the harvest has been sold, 
hence the amount which can be spent in period t+1 is 
(11) m t + 1 = mt + h t + 1 - ct. 
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The ration (x ) becomes known just after the harvest. The farmer then 
decides how much to consume, taking into account the constraints 
(12)- cfc <_ xfc 
(13) c t < m t 
and the effect, via (11), on his future consumption possibilities. If he 
maximizes expected utility in a two-period model then the problem just 
after the harvest in the first period is: 
max W = u(c ,h) + Eu(c . ,h ) 
, t t t+1 t+1 
Wi 
subject to (11), (12), (13) and m , h given. 
The farmer does nót know the ration for the next period (x^ ,) but he 
* t+1 
does know its density function f(x). We assume that f(x) is continuous 
and positive for all positive x and we write x for the mean ration: 
(14) x = /Q x f(x) dx. 
After the harvest in the second period the problem is simply: 
max u(ct+1, hfc+1) 
Ct+1 
subject to ct+1 <_xt+1; cfc <.mt+1; mfc+1, hfc+1 given 
which gives: 
(15) c*+1 = min(xt+1, m ^ ) . 
Hence the two-period problem may be rewritten as: 
mt+l 
max W = u(ct,hfc) + fQ u(x,hfc+1) f(x) dx + u(mfc+1/hfc+1) f^ f(x)dx 
ct'ht+l t + 1 
subject to (11), (12), (13) and m , h given. 
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Note that in a stationary equilibrium without rationing, consumption, 
effort and money balances would satisfy: 
(16) ct - h t = mt = c* 
where c* solves the first-order condition 
(17) u (c*,c*) + u2(c*,c*) = 0 
which simply states that in equilibrium the marginal benefit of working 
harder (the utility of extra consumption) must be equal to the marginal 
7 
cost (the utility of foregone leisure). We assume that the farmer is in 
unrationed equilibrium for t = 0 and that rationing starts, unexpectedly, 
in period 1 : 
(18) c* = m, = h . 
We are interested in the decisions taken by the farmer in the average 
case, i.e. when 
(19) x = x. 
Differentiation of the objective function with respect to h gives: 
(20) ïïr— = u (B ,h...) +u,h,, | (h ) ƒ f(x) dx 3h , 1 t+1 t+1 2 t+1 t+1 m. . 
t+1 t+1 
+ /„ t + 1 u.(x,h. .) f(x) dx 0 2 t+1 
=*
( mt +l' ht +l } 
It is convenient to define the function 
(21) 5(mt,ht+1) = *(mt + h t + 1 - x , ht+1) 
which is decreasing in both arguments, since (suppressing the arguments 
of the utility function): 
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(22) £. = (u..+u„.) ƒ f(x) dx - u. f(z) < O 
1 11 21 Z 1 
(23) ?2 - 5 + (u12+u22) f" f(x) dx + /Q U 2 2 f(X) dx < l^ 
where z = ni + h, . - x. 
t t+1 
Consider the function h , = y(ni ) defined by 5 (m . h ) = 0 . Total 
t+1 t t t+i 
differentiation of the defining relation gives: 
(24)
 5ldmt + 52 dhfc+1 - 0 
hence, since E, < E, < 0, the slope of the function y satisfies: 
(25) -1 < ^ = - V 5 2 < 0 -
It immediately follows that the slope of the function 
(26) g(m ) = m + y (m ) - x 
satisfies 
(27) 0 < g - < 1, 
The function g is relevant because of the following results: 
Lemma 1. The solution to the two-period problem satisfies m = g[max(x,m )] 
Proof. In the appendix it is shown that the solution satisfies c = min(x,m ): 
t t 
at least one of the constraints (12) , (13) is binding. The first-order 
condition for h implies, from (20): ^ to ,,h .) = 0. 
_ t+i t+1 t+1 
Suppose c = x. Then, by construction, h , = y(m ) satisfies the first-order t t+1 t 
condition and 
(28) m t + 1 = mt + hfc+1 - cfc = mt + y(mt) - x = g(mt). 
If,however, c^ = m^ then cj>(ni + h . - m . h ) = 0 implies h^ , = y (x) 
t t t t+1 t t+l t+l 
Hence in that case 
(29) mfc+1 = mfc + hfc+1 - cfc = m + y(x) - m = g(x). 
Therefore m = g(mt) if x <_mfc and mt+1 = g(x) otherwise. 
- 12 -
Corollary 0 < g(x) < c*. 
Proof. If h = g(x) then h solves <j>(h,h) = 0. From (20) it follows that 
u.(h,h) + u (h,h) > 0. Because of (10), this is consistent with (17) only 
if h = g(x) < c*. To prove that g(x) is positive, note that (10c) implies 
$(0,0) > 0. Substitution in (21) gives £(x",0) > 0.. Since 5 (x", y (x)) = 0 and 
£„ is negative this implies y(x) > 0. Hence, from (26), g(x) > 0. 
Lemma 2. If x~ < c* then g(0) > 0. 
Proof. First note that, since x < c* and c* > 0: 
(30) C(o,x) = <f>(o,x) = u (o,x) + u„(o,x) 
> u (c*,c*) + u (c*, c*) = 0 
Secondly, from the definition of y: 
(31) 5[o,y(o)] = 0 
and since E, is decreasing in its second argument (£ <0) , (30) and (31) 
imply that y(o) > x. Substitution in (26) gives the desired result: 
(32) g(o) > 0. 
The function g is shown.in Figure 2. Here all parameters of the density 
function f(x) and of the utility function are kept constant. These 
parameters determine c*, the mean x and the riskiness of the ration and 
the function g itself. What remains is the dependence of h (and hence 
of m ,) on the initial money stock m . In Figure 2, m is measured 
along the horizontal axis. If it exceeds x then m = g(m ) , otherwise 
nr . = g(x) (lemma 1). t+1 
Since c = min(x, m ) and m . = m + h - c , the optimal values of 
e. and h follow immediately. t t+l 
That only the four cases shown are possible follows from the corollary. 
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m t+l + * m t+1 + 
m* m •+• 
(a) g(c*) > c" 
m* c* m -*• 
(b) g(c*) < c* and g(x) > 
m 
't+1 f f 
g(x) 
' t+1 + 
(cl) g(c*) < c* and 
g(x) < x < c* 
(c2) g(c*) < c* and 
g(x) < c* < x 
Figure 2. Optimal money balance (m*) as fixed point of the 
mapping m. ,, = g [max (x,in )]. t+1 t 
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Provided the parameters of the problem remain constant, the diagram may 
also be used to tracé changes in the optimal solution over time, by 
interpreting m as the initial money stock in the next two-period 
problem. In cases (a) and (b) it is clear that in such a sequence of 
two-period problems m will converge to m*. Since the sequence starts at 
m = c* and c* lies to the left of the fixed point m* in diagram (a) but 
to the right in diagram (b), the two cases differ in the direction from 
which the long run equilibrium is approached. Money balances rise in 
case (a) and fall in case (b). 
In case (c2) the mapping m -* g(m) is not relevant. Since x > c* = m., 
m = g(x) = m* < c* (lemma 1 and corollary). Hence the money stock falls 
from c* to m* and then remains constant. Case- (cl) combines features of 
diagrams (b) and (c2). Since x < c* = m., initially the mapping m -* g(m) 
applies. The money stock will fall and there must be a time t* such that 
m ^ ^ x; m then falls to m* and remains constant. t* 
In all four cases m* is the fixed point of the mapping m •* g [max (x,m)]. 
The existence of this fixed point follows trivially from (27) and lemma 2 
in the first three cases. In case (c2) , however, lemma 2 does not apply 
since then x > c*. However since g(x) is positive (corollary), the line 
m t+ 
= g(x) must intersect the 45 line, hence m* exists (and is positive) 
Figure 2 suggests that in case (a), in a sequence of overlapping two-period 
models, it is optimal for farmers to react to the imposition of rationing 
by a process of adjustment during which money balances increase (converging 
to m* > c*) and effort decreases (converging to h* = x); that in case (b) 
money balances fall over time (converging to m* < c*) and effort increases 
(converging to h* = x); and, finally, that in case (c) money balances fall 
and effort increases until, in long-run equilibrium, m* = h* < x. This 
result we now state and prove. 
Theorem 1. 
Consider a sequence of two-period problems (t = 1,2,..): 
mt+l 
max W = u(c ,h ) + ƒ u(x,li.) f(x) dx + ƒ u(ni , ,h ,) f(x) 
VVi mt+1 
subject to cfc <_ x; c <_ m ; m = h + m - c ; and m = h = 
Then the optimal sequences m_, m ,.. and h_, h ,.. satisfy: 
(a) iff 5(c*,x) > 0: 
C
*
 > ht+l > ht+2 > ^ ht = ^; ^ mt = m* > mt+2 > Vl > °* 
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(b) iff S(c*,x) < O < S(x\x): 
lim h t = x > h t + 2 > h ,- c* > m > m t + 2 > lim m = m* 
t-*°° t-*=° 
(c) iff C(x,x) < 0: 
« > \ + 2 > ht+i > °«- c* > » t + 1 1 » t + 2 1 V 2 
with the weak inequalities strict only for t < t*. 
Proof 
1. Case (a) is defined (see fig. 2) by g(c*) > c*. From (26) this is 
equivalent to y(c*) > x. But C(c*,z) is decreasing in z and equal to 
zero for z = y (c*), hence y(c*) > x if and only if £(c*,x) is positive. 
Similarly, case (c) is defined by g(x) < x and this is equivalent to 
y(x) < x hence C(x,x) < 0 is both necessary and sufficiënt for case (c) 
2. In case (a) , since m. = c* and m = g(m ) , the sequence m. , m ,,. 
converges monotonically from below to m*. But from (27)
 f 
for all m < m*: 
(33) mt+2 " mt+l = g(mt+l) " g ( V * mt+l " mt 
which, since h , = m , - m^ - x, implies 
t+1 t+1 t 
(34)
 V 2 < h t + r 
Hence effort decreases monotonically and converges to x. 
3. In case (b) the sequence m , m ,.. starts to the right rather than 
the left of the fixed point. Hence the same argument applies, but 
the inequalities in (33) and (34) are reversed: m converges 
monotonically from above to m*, and h converges monotonically from 
below to x. 
4. We have already noted that £(c*,z) is decreasing in z. If x < c* then 
— c* 
C(c*,c*) = <j>(2c*-x, c*) < <f)(c*,c*) = ƒ u (x,c*) f(x) dx < 0. Hence 
h = y (m ) = y(c*) < c*: in case (a) effort is, throughout the adjustment 
process, lower than in the absence of rationing. 
5. In case (cl) m = c* > x and m initially decreases monotonically as 
in case (b) (Figure 2 ) . But since g(x) <.x, there must be a time t* such 
"that m * < x. Hence (lemma 1) ni = c = h , . = g(x) = m* < x for all 
t* t t t+1 
t > t*, from which the result in the theorem follows trivially. In 
case (c2) , the first phase, with m . = g(m ) , does not apply: t* = 1 
hence the money stock is immediately reduced to m*. 
This completes the proof. 
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We now restrict our attention to the case where mean availability is 
reduced (x < c*). It is useful to decompose the initial effect of rationing 
on the money balance (m -m ) into a planned and an unplanned change; 
. (35) m2 - m1 = h* - x = -(l^ -c*) + (c*-x) . 
Since the onset of rationing was unexpected, the farmer had planned to 
consume a quantity c* but he can consume only x. Hence the second term in 
brackets in (35) is positive and measures an unplanned increase in money 
holding. This is offset by the first term, which, as we have just seen, 
is negative. If this first term dominates then h* < x and this, as we now 
know, is the case iff ?(c*,x) < 0. Hence the initial, positive, unplanned 
effect on money balances is reinforced for £(c*,x) > 0 and reversed for 
?(c*,x) < 0. 
Theorem 1 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a long-run (stationary) 
equilibrium and the convergence and monotonicity of the adjustment process. 
More importantly, the theorem gives a very simple conditipn for the sign 
of the effect of stochastic rationing on effort and on money stocks, a 
condition which involves only the sign of £(c*,x). We now turn to the 
effects of changes in the models parameters on the money stock m*. 
Consider first the situation where the farmer overestimates the mean x. 
This may e.g. be the case when the severity of rationing increases: it 
will take time before the farmer realises that a lower ration x does not 
represent bad luck (x < x: the case of an unlucky draw from an unchanged 
probability distribution) but an unfavourable shift in the probability 
distribution (x = x. but x has fallen). We model this, slightly artificially, 
by assuming that the farmer uses in his calculations not f(x) but 
f (x) = ff (x-e) for x >_ e 
\ö otherwise 
where e, a positive number, is the amount by which the mean is over-
estimated. In cases (a) and (b), h = x and m = m* in long-run equilibrium, 
hence 
(36) £(m*,x) = [u, (m*,x) +u.(m*,x)] ƒ % f(x) dx + ƒ? u_(x,x) f(x) 
1 z m u £ 
* 
= n. 
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When the mean is overestimated the integral boundary m* must be replaced 
by m*-e. Hence: 
(37) £ dm* + u (m*,x) f(m*) de = 0 
and, since 5 is negative and u. is positive, this implies that the effect 
of the overestimation of the mean x on the money stock m* is positive. 
Next consider the case where availability improves: f(x) shifts a distance e 
to the right (and the farmer perceives this correctly). In this case x 
must be replaced by x + e in (36), in addition to the change in the integral 
boundary. Then: 
(38) 5.dm* + [(u.„+u.„) ƒ % f(x) dx + ƒ? u00 f(x) + u. f (ra .) ] de = 0 1 12. ZZ m u " i 
The sign of the terms in square brackets is ambiguous, hence without 
further restriction on the functions u and f, we cannot say whether an 
increase in availability x leads to higher or lower money balances m*. 
However, for many reasonable functional forms (e.g. in the numerical example 
presented below) the effect can be negative. In that case, if rationing 
becomes more severe, farmers respond, paradoxically, by accumulating larger 
money balances (e.g. in Figure 3 a move from B to A). 
In case (c), x must be replaced by m* in (36). It follows that if 
availability improves: 
(39) £ dm* + u (m*, m*) f(m*) de = 0 
hence in this case the effect of x on m* is unambiguously positive. 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of availability (x) on money stocks in 
long-run equilibrium (m*). Here the parameters of the utility function 
are kept constant and only the mean of the density function f(x) is allowed 
to change (the riskiness of the ration is kept constant). 
As drawn, Figure 3 shows examples of all four types of equilibria: for 
x < x < x we have case (a) of Figure 2; for x < x or x < x < x , case (b); 
— — — 10 
for x < x < c*, case (cl); and for x > c* case (c2) . This is not necessarily 
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.m* 
c* 
x2x3 c< 
Figure 3. Money balances (m*) and availability (x) under 
stochastic rationing. 
true; e.g. for a lower degree of riskiness, case (a) may not occur 
(cf. Table 1). In the absence of rationing the farmer would choose 
point D. Money stocks are then independent of rationing. Under deterministic 
rationing the relation between m* and x is proportional: the farmer then 
chooses a point on OD. 
Note that the curve does not pass through D: if x equals c* the farmer 
does not behave as in the absence of rationing. Because the ration is 
risky, x is not action-equivalent to c*, even if x = c* (the distance 
between the curve and point D is similar to a risk premium). Under stochastic 
rationing, the farmer will choose to hold more money than in the deterministic 
case if rationing is sufficiently severe (x < x ). We have seen that case (a) 
arises iff 5(c*,x) is positive, i.e. if x < x < x in Figure 3. Money stocks 
are then in the long run (at points such as A) higher than in the absence 
of rationing. This implies a policy problem in two senses. First, when 
availability deteriorates, the negative effect on output is mitigated 
in the short run by the need to increase money stocks: the balance of 
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payments position will appear to be better than it is in the long run. 
Conversely, if the government improves availability in order to boost 
exports output increases less than proportionately because it is optimal 
to decumulate money. Note that at A, m* > c*: farmers will reduce their 
m'oney bala'nces even if f uil availability were to be restored. The monetary 
overhang may make it very difficult for a government to break out of the 
rationing regime. 
While the effect of improved availability on m* is ambiguous, the effect on 
cash erop production is unambiguously positive. For the long run this result 
is trivial: since h* = x, production increases with availability. 
But, using (21) we can show that this is also true in the short run: 
(40) X dh + X2dE = 0 
where 
mt+l 
(41) X = (u..+u +u +u ) ƒ f(x) dx + ƒ u . u„„ f(x) dx - u,f(ni .) < 
1 11 12 21 22 m.,_,i " " 1 t+1 
(42) X_ = -(U..+U..) f f(x) dx + 2u1.f(nr ,) > 0 2 11 21 m. ,, 1 t+l t+1 
dh2 
hence - — is positive. 
In this sense the analysis of section 3 is not affected by the introduction 
of money: it remains true that an initial fall in cash erop production is 
reinforced by its feedback effect, via the balance of payments, on 
availability. 
As an example, consider the separable utility function: 
(43) u = c1 R/(l-R) + (t-h)1-Y/ü-Y) (R,y > 0; R,y |* 1) 
which has constant relative risk aversion (of degree R) with respect to 
-—R — Y R Y 
consumption. Since u. = c and u_ = -(t-h) , c* solves c = (t-c) . Assume 
2 
that In x is normally distributed with mean u and variance a . Then 
— 2 
x = exp(p+a /2) and 
(44) f f(x)dx - P(i2-S=H.) - F ( l n W* +% 
m <3 o 2 
where F is the complement of the normal distribution function: 
(45) F(z) = /^ exp (-y2/2) dy. 
20 -
Substitution in (20) gives the relation between x and m in long-run 
equilibrium: 
„,ln (m*/x") , g, (m*)R 
F ( - + _) = _ [t-min(x,m*)J 
For R = 2, Y = 4 , t = 10+ /ÏÖ (and hence c* = 10), the results are shown 
in Table 1, for three different values of a. Column (2) depicts a case of 
moderate riskiness: o = 0.5 implies that x exceeds 0.5 x, x and 1.5 x with 
probability 0.87, 0.40 and 0.14 respe.ctively. In this case the relation 
between m* and x is as shown in Figure 3, with x = 3.7, x = 9.3 and 
x, = 9.4. Hence if x falls more than 7 % short of c* then money stocks are 
higher than in the absence of risk (m* > x). In particular, if x is less 
than 93 % but more than 37 % of c*, we get the honeymoon result (m* > c*). 
E.g. for x = 6.2, the optimal money stock is 20 % higher (and velocity 
almost 50 % lower) than in the absence of rationing. Finally, if rationing 
is very severe (x < 3.7) then m* is again less than c*. 
12 
For a greater degree of riskiness (e.g. a = 0.8, as in column (3)), the 
peak in Fig. 3 becomes.steeper (the same is true for an increase in the 
degree of risk aversion, R). Conversely, if riskiness decreases the function 
becomes flatter and, for sufficiently low a, m* no longer exceeds c* for 
any value of x: there is then no honeymoon (column (1)). As a approaches 
zero, the function approaches the 45 line. 
Table 1. Optimal money stock (m' 
m* 
*) , mean < 
X (1) (2) (3) 
2.0 4.0 6.7 10.0 
3.7 6.1 10.0 13.3 
5.0 7.7 11.3 14.1 
6.2 8.8 11.9 13.8 
8.0 9.8 11.2 11.7 
9.0 9.7 10.0 9.7 
9.3 9.5 9.3 9.3 
10.0 9.6 9.4 9.3 
15.0 10.0 9.8 9.6 
0.2 0.5 0.8 
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The present model has two important implications for our analysis. First, 
adjustment to a regime in which farmers are rationed is not instantaneous. 
Secondly, the effect of rationing on cash erop production may be perverse during 
this adjustment process: it may be optimal to work harder during this 
process (and hence to produce more) than in long-run equilibrium. 
It is instructive to determine whether these two results are due to the 
introduction of stochastic rationing or to the second way in which we 
changed the model in this section: the introduction of money. 
To begin, let us note that, while we have remarked in passing that money 
is also kept for transaction purposes, in the analysis money has only one role: 
it is a store of value. Clearly, if the cash erop could be stored costlessly 
after the harvest then all of the preceding analysis for a monetary 
economy would apply to a barter economy as well, m now being interpreted 
as stored output rather than a money balance. In this sense our results 
are not due to the introduction of money into the model but to the 
stochastic nature of rationing (given the existence of an asset which 
would be perfect in the absence of rationing). The role money (or a similar 
asset) plays in our results becomes clear if we introducé stochastic 
rationing into a model without assets (i.e. there is no money and neither 
good is storable). In that case, there is no dynamie adjustment %left. 
The farmer reaches the new, stationary equilibrium instantaneously; 
c* = e* = x and h* = h* ±3 the solution to t t 
.h °° 
max ƒ_ u(x,h) f (x) dx + u(h,h) ƒ. f (x) dx. 
h ° • . 
The first-order condition is: 
,h 
(46) fQ u2(x,h) f(x) dx + CU]L (h,h) + u2 (h,h)] ƒ f(x) dx = 0. 
In this model the farmer faces the risk that some of his work on the 
cash erop will be wasted. The erop is exchanged directly for consumption 
goods, but the labour input decision which determines the size of the 
erop (h) has to be taken before the amount of consumption goods 
available (x) is known. If h turns out to exceed x then the difference 
is simply wasted: it cannot be stored (either directly or indirectly as 
money). 
Since the first term in (46) is negative, we have 
(47)
 U l (h*,h*) + u2 (h*,h*) > 0 = u (c*,c*) + u2 (c*,c*) 
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hence output is lower than in unrationed equilibrium 
(48) h* < c*. 
Note that the first-order condition implies 
(49) ••(h*,h*) = 0. 
Assume that the honeymoon condition 5(c*,x) > 0 is satisfied. 
This implies 
(50) <Mc*,x) > 0. 
But <j> is decreasing in both its arguments hence h* <_ x < c* is not 
possible, therefore 
(51) x" < h* < c*. 
Hence if the honeymoon condition is satisfied so that in the monetary 
model production converges to its long-run equilibrium value (x) 
from above then in the barter model output is constant at a 
level above x. This does not mean that the honeymoon is permanent. On the 
contrary: the government can, obviously, procure only as much of the erop 
as farmers are able to exchange for consumption goods so that (while 
production is higher) exports are permanently equal to x. 
Hence in this case rationing is sufficiently severe, the ration is 
sufficiently risky and/or the farmer is sufficiently risk averse for the 
wastage of effort implied by h* > x to be optimal. The role of money is 
now clear: it enables the farmer to adjust to an equilibrium in which 
this wastage is eliminated. We summarize our results as follows. 
Theorem 2. 
For x < c*, cash erop production (h*) satisfies (for t = 2,3,..) 
(a) in the absence of rationing: h* = c* 
(b) in the case of deterministic rationing: h* = x < c* (all t) 
(c) in the case of stochastic rationing (no money): 
x" < h* = h* < c*, for 5(c*,x) > 0 
(d) in the case of stochastic rationing (with money): 
x" < h* , < h* <' c*, for C(c*,x) > 0. 
t+l t 
Exports are equal to x in case (c) and to h* in the three other 
cases. 
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Hence the point about the model of this section compared with the earlier 
case of deterministic rationing in a barter model is not that it introduces 
the possibility of effort exceeding the mean value of the ration (h* > x) : 
this would be true a fortiori in case (c). The point is rather that if 
farmers hold money then exports also exceed x, but the difference 
disappears over time. The government enjoys a honeymoon in the sense that 
it effectively obtains the erop at a lower price during the adjustment 
process: the farmers' terms of trade deteriorate temporarily. 
At the end of the previous section we remarked that the money balances 
built up by farmers in response to rationing, might make it very difficult 
to break out of the rationing regime. Figure 3 indicates that this could 
be true even if the government managed to restore full availability (and 
remove uncertainty) at a stroke. If the initial situation involves a money 
stock greater than c* and farmers are convinced that the new one is at D, 
they will want to eliminate the excess money balance (m*-c*) and this affects 
output negatively. Unless aid donors are willing to finance the claim 
against the government which this monetary overhang represents fully, some 
sort of default is unavoidable. This might take the form of xaising the 
price of the cash erop and the price of the consumption good in proportion. 
The producer price then remains constant in real terms, but desired money 
stocks rise since m* is linear homogeneous in prices. If prices are raised 
sufficiently, farmers will want to continue to hold the accumulated money 
balances, even in unrationed equilibrium at point D. A currency reconstruc-
14 
tion is an alternative form of default, which is formally equivalent 
5. Conclusion 
Our first conclusion is that such an economy may, when exposed 
to a shock, end up in a regime in which farmers are rationed. The economy 
will not return to an unrationed equilibrium and, indeed, the balance of 
payments deficit will get larger after the initial shock. Secondly, 
raising the producer price for export crops will make matters worse. 
Thirdly, our theoretical analysis in section 4 established that stochastic 
rationing may have unexpected effects on money demand. The behaviour of 
farmers in response to rationing differs qualitatively, depending on 
the sign of £(c*,x) and of £(x,x). For sufficiently severe rationing 
a liberalization attempt which ignores the monetary overhang caused by 
risk is doomed to fail. 
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Appendix 
1. Existence. Consider the two-period problem: 
max m 
Wi w = tt(ct'ht+i} + u ( V i ' h t + i » 'm , f ( x ) d x + V u(x'Vi)f(x)dx 
t+1 
subject to: 
(Al) c <_ x (X) 
(A2) c <_ m (u) 
(A3) hfc+1 <_c*(v) 
<A«) v ht+i i ° 
( A 5 ) m t + l = m t + ht+l - c t 
(A6) m , h predetermined, positive and finite. 
The objective function W is strictly concave, because of assumption (10); 
the constraints (Al), (A2), (A3) are convex, and the feasible set is bounded 
and non-empty (since c = h = 0 is feasible). Hence the Kuhn-Tucker 
*
 J
 t t+1 
conditions are sufficiënt for a unique optimum. It remains to show that 
the solution used in section 4 satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. From 
Figure 2 and theorem 1, m is positive for all t and (since x is positive) 
on so is c = min (x,ni ) . In the paper, h ,, was determined as the soluti t t t+1 
to <Mmt+1 'ht+i) = ° h e n c e 
(A7) w. = *(n.±.(h. _,_,) - v = 0 h , t+1 t+1 
t+1 
is satisfied with v equal to zero. Also, condition (A3), which was not 
imposed in section 4 but which does not affect the solution, is satisfied. 
Since c is positive, the remaining Kuhn-Tucker condition is 
(A8) u. (c.,h.) - u. (in. ,h ) /°° f(x) dx = X + y > 0. 
1 t t 1 t+1 t+1 m4-.-1 
If the inequality in (A8) is strict then either (Al) or (A2) must be binding. 
Hence if X + y > 0 then the assumption in section 4 that c = min (x,m ) is 
justified. 
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Proof of c = min (x,m ) 
Hence we wish to show that 
(A9) u. (c ,h ) > u.(ni .,h ) ƒ f(x) dx. 1 t t 1 t+1 t+1 m . t+l 
Substituting <j> (m « fh ) = 0 from (20), this is equivalent to: 
co "V+1 
(AIO) u (c ,h ) + u0(in ,h ) ƒ f(x) dx+ ƒ u.(x,h ï f(x) dx > 0 
1 t t l t+1 t+1 mj., 1 ° 2 t+1 
Since u f_ 0: 
(All) u„(ni . ,h .) r f(x) dx > ƒ" u_(x,h .) f(x) dx. 
2 t+1 t+1 mfc+1 - m t + 1 2 t+1 
Hence, i'f 
(A12) u. (c .h ) + ƒ" u (Xfh. ..) f(x) dx > 0 1 t t o 2 t+1 
then (A9) is satisfied. ïn cases (a), (b) and (cl) we have: c , h , h <_ c* 
and x < c*. Hence in those cases: 
(A13) u1(ct,h.t) + u2(x,ht+1) > 0. 
Since u is assumed to be convex in x, Jensen's inequality gives: 
(A14) f° u„(x,h .) f(x) dx > u„(x,h ) O 2. t+1 — 2 t+1 
and (A12) follows from substitution of (A14) in (A13) . 
In case (c2) this result does not apply since then x > c*. But u <_ 0 
implies: 
m+-+l mt+l (A15) ƒ t+1 u_(x,h.
 x1) f(x) dx > u„(ni .,h ) ƒ f(x) dx. o 2 t+1 — 2 t+1 t+1 o 
In case (c2) either ni , < ni < c* or ni . = in = g(x) < c* (corollary) : in 
t+l t — t+l t 
either case m < c*. In addition: m , c , h , h <_ c*, hence: 
(A16) V c ^ ) + u2(mt+1,ht+1) = y V h t ) + u2(mt+1,ht+1) ' ^ M ** + 
m 
+ u 2
( m
t +i' h t +i ) •'"o f(x) d x .^ u (c*,c*) + u (c*,c*) > 0. 
and (AIO) follows from substitution of (AÏ5) in (Al6). 
Hence (A9) is always satisfied: X + y is positive and hence c = min (x~,mt). 
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Notes 
* This paper is based on research financed in part by the World Bank and 
the Trade Policy Research Centre. The ópinions expressed here are those 
of the authors. They are grateful to Arne Bigsten, Ian Little, Claus 
Weddepohl and Martin Wolf for comments on earlier versions. 
1 This linearity assumption is not essential to our argument, but it 
simplifies the algebra considerably. 
2 The price change must be small in the sense that c* (which will change 
with p) continues to be larger than p. 
3 Our assumptions on the utility function do not guarantee this shape of 
the offer curve. It is, however, sufficiënt to assume that the cash erop 
supply function q* (p) is upward sloping. E.g. if we approximate this 
function locally by the iso-elastic function q* = q p (n > o), then, 
since c* = pq*, 
de . „ 
- = p
 + q/qp > 0 
and 
2 
—2.= 1/q + (q -qq )/q = (1+1/n )/q > o. 
d q
2
 P P PP P P 
Hence, for all p for which output is increasing in the producer 
price, the offer curve q*(c*) is increasing and concave. For the special 
case of a Stone-Geary utility function u = (c-c) (f-f) (1-SL) , it 
may be shown that this sufficiënt condition (a* positive) is satisfied 
iff demand for the consumption good is income elastic. 
4 Elsewhere, Bevan et al. (forthcoming), we have considered the 
urban economy in more detail, distinguishing five agents: the government, 
entrepreneurs in the formal and in the informal sector, wage earners 
and black marketeers. 
5 If farmers consider the bad harvest as a transient phenomenon and 
realise that the decline in coffee production was the only reason for 
rationing then they would not change their behaviour at all and the 
economy would return to point B. More generally, if they expect to be 
able to buy at least OQ of the consumption good then they will be 
rationed in the next period, but the equilibrium will be stable: 
farmers will be able to buy as much as they expected. Hence a necessary 
condition for the contractionary adjustment process is that farmers' 
expectations are sufficiently pessimistic in the sense that E(x) < OQ. 
Note that in a pure barter model the government would have to abandon 
its policy immediately after the bad harvest, either by exchanging less 
than JI for the erop (i.e. by lowering p) or by giving less than KL 
to urban consumers. This is not the case described in the text. 
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We implicitly assume that farmers hold money but only enough to finance 
thèir expected purchases of consumption goods üïitil the next harvest. 
If these purchases are spread over time then they will find out that 
they are being rationed only in the course of the year, after they 
have exchanged their erop for money. The case where money is not 
just held for current transaction demand is considered in the next 
section. 
6 An appeal to restrictions on third-order derivatives is common in the 
economics of risk. A well-known example is the effect of risk on savings: 
if the first-order derivative of a one-argument utility function is convex, 
then savings increase with riskiness. 
If the utility function u(c,h) is separable (u = 0), as in the numerical 
example below, then (lOd) is satisfied. Separability is sufficiënt, but 
not necessary; (lOd) is, e.g., also satisfied for a Stone-Geary specifica-
tion u = c (t-h) (0<a<l). 
7 Note that, since u <0, u <0, u <_0, (10c) implies that c* is positive. 
8 Note that we do not assume x<c*. In the riskless case this assumption 
would be natural, but in the presence of risk the farmer's decisions will 
be affected by rationing even if x=c*. 
9 The other predetermined variable (h ) does not affect the solution since 
uti'lity in the two periods is additive. 
10 Note that the curve is drawn with a kink for x=x . At that point the first 
derivative is indeed not continuous. This is because the mapping changes 
from m-s-gdn) to m->-g(x) . 
11 For o = 0.2 these probabilities are 0.9996, 0.46, 0.02 and for o = 0.8 
they are 0.68, 0.34, 0.18. 
12 We interpret riskiness in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 
1971). Hence an increase in riskiness is modelled as a mean-preserving 
1 2 .
 n . 
spread: an increase of a and a decrease of u, keeping u + r<J and nence 
x constant. 
13 Note that, while the nominal prices of the cash erop and of the consumption 
good are fixed, neither money nor the cash erop is a perfect asset: 
rationing limits the convertibility of the asset into consumption goods. 
14 The distributional consequences in the urban sector of various methods 
of sterilizing the monetary overhang (including the effects of a 
devaluation) are considered in Bevan et al. (forthcoming). 
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